"We require a tool that obliges us to find a future solution for the question of disposal"

On 1st December 2015, BfS President Wolfram König was consulted by the commission on the monitoring of the financing of the phasing out of nuclear power (KFK).

The subject was the question of which conclusions are to be drawn from the experiences of the BfS in nuclear disposal for the securing of financing.

Mr König, the long-term securing of financing for renaturation and disposal is frequently referred to as an eternal task. Do you share this opinion?

The aim is the long-term secure and unmonitored storage. This means that final storage is a great challenge that will continue to occupy us over the next decades. But it is not an eternal task. Against this background, the example of overcoming the so-called “long-term liabilities” of Ruhr coal mining does not hold weight.

Where then do you see the risks in financing the disposal of radioactive waste?

Today, in particular through the cross-party agreement to phase out the use of nuclear power, we have an historic opportunity to tackle the problem comprehensively and to solve it in terms of safety. To date, the provision of funds had not yet had any influence on the safety standards of disposal.

We must however adapt ourselves to the fact that with the increasing implementation of the agreed phasing out of nuclear power, economic aspects will increase in significance. Therefore we require a financing model that ensures that the necessary funds for renaturation are invested in a future-proof and insolvency-proof way and that the interests of safety are not displaced by other interests.

So, in your view, is safe renaturation and final storage in the future primarily a problem of financing?

With the complete phasing out of nuclear power, the specialist knowledge and also the pressure to find a solution for disposal will reduce. We therefore require a tool that obliges all participants to arrange a solution to the problem that is as prompt as possible.

Legislators in the 1970s were already thinking along similar lines. The result was the introduction of a so-called proof of precautionary measure for disposal. This had to be produced by the operators of nuclear power stations. The approval for the operation of the power station was thus for the first time directly connected to the advancement of final storage issues. But this interdependence has been softened over the decades.

Today we require a tool that obliges all participants to engage with the future solution of the disposal question.

What significance do you apportion to citizen participation in the search for a final repository?

Final storage is not only an enormous technical challenge. We equally require serious and transparent citizen participation. Because, as has been clearly shown in the past, final storage sites cannot be realised without the involvement of citizens.

The renaturation of nuclear power stations is the task of the operator. When does the public task actually begin and where does the greatest cost risk lie?

The cut-off point between the private and public task is, put simply, the point in time when the containers of radioactive waste are handed over from interim storage to the final repository. Prior to this, the waste producers are responsible for safety under state oversight.

The costs for the federal task of final storage are transferred proportionally to the waste producers. The greatest cost risk lies in pushing the solving of the problem along the time axis.

To date, the only location investigated for highly active waste is the Gorleben salt stock. When will a decision be made about the suitability or otherwise of Gorleben?

Whether Gorleben would or would not be suitable as a final repository location has not been conclusively investigated. Likewise, possible alternative locations to the Gorleben salt stock have not yet been considered in depth. Gorleben is also not further explored but currently kept open. This has been specified by the location selection procedure, agreed cross-party in the Bundestag, which is as it should be.

For more than 15 years, I have campaigned for a criteria-based comparison of potential final storage locations – for both specialist and legal reasons. If only Gorleben is to be further investigated as just one site, then it could itself ultimately fail in terms of geological suitability because no alternatives have been compared.

Within the currently agreed selection procedure, Gorleben remains firmly in the running.

And how expensive will the investigation of alternatives be?

That depends on the approach, the selected rock formation and the exploration programme. But the very high costs for the Gorleben exploration mines are not easy to transfer to the search for a new location. The exploration timeframes and the costs for future sites could be significantly lower than those that have been estimated for Gorleben.

At Gorleben, the infrastructure and the mines are constructed in dimensions that are designed for a later final repository. This is unnecessary for purely exploratory mining. Furthermore, in the currently applicable search procedure and in contrast to the exploration at Gorleben, the requirements to be fulfilled and a staged search procedure are to be identified first before work is begun at a concrete location. This enables a targeted procedure that will also lead to considerably fewer time delays caused by irrelevant interventions.

Time delays and other problems are reported time and again in the realisation of final storage. Why is this?

The planning and construction of a final repository to meet atomic law regulations is not a task that has been carried out yet. On the one hand, the operator responsibility – for good reason – resides with the state; on the other hand, the operative business was handed over by the federal government over 30 years ago to an operational management company in the nuclear power station sector.

This structure is not appropriate, breeds mistrust in the independent completion of tasks, creates unnecessary dual structures and restricts competition and efficient processes. This basic problem has existed for a long time; I have mentioned it frequently in the past and have suggested various solutions.

Mr König, has the renaturation of the nuclear power station been delayed because the Konrad mine final repository for low-level and intermediate-level waste is not yet operational?

The challenges in the disposal of radioactive waste are historically systematically underestimated. Furthermore, a representative debate about the fors and againsts of nuclear energy itself is ongoing around the question of final storage. This has seriously complicated and delayed overall the realisation of final repository projects.

At the Konrad mine, the final repository currently under construction for low-level and intermediate-level radioactive waste, the legal procedures in particular have taken far longer than originally planned. The original plans for the Konrad mine were made in the 1980s and 1990s. Until 2007, due to ongoing legal action against Konrad, no investment could be made in its modernisation and conversion. Only since 2007, following fundamental revision, has it been possible to bring the plans into implementation.

The fact is this: it is not the Konrad mine that is delaying the renaturation of the nuclear power station. Even if Konrad went into operation tomorrow, only around 1 per cent of the radioactive waste already in existence could be brought to Konrad. To date only 3,000 cubic metres of waste have been packaged and compacted in a way that fulfils the long-known acceptance conditions of the Konrad mine. So there is no accumulation at the sites because the Konrad mine is not yet operational.

Who has prevented the BfS or others from making a start before 2007 on the conversion of the Konrad mine into a final repository?

Quite simply, the sovereign, who has not provided any budget for the construction of Konrad. This is because of the fundamental stipulation to first await the ongoing claims against the Konrad mine and until then not to undertake any further works, which was also reasonable.

Where do the delays arise in the operational start-up of final repository projects such as the Konrad mine?

The Konrad mine is an old extraction mine that must be converted according to the high standards of atomic law from ongoing operation into a final repository. The expense and the deadline risks for this have in the past been systematically underestimated. However, this circumstance has nothing to do with the long-term safety of the final repository.

Would it not then be advantageous to bundle all disposal tasks – from renaturation of the nuclear power station through to interim and final storage – into one institution or foundation?

No. There is no reason why this enormous string of different activities must be under one umbrella. The challenges of building a final repository are for example different to those of dismantling a nuclear power station or operating an interim storage facility for castor containers. Additionally, an organisation of this type would mix private economic and state tasks and interests.

It is precisely this that has been one of the problems in the current structure. On the contrary it should be ensured that no new interest combinations of economic considerations and safety questions can arise. It is right that the state is responsible for final storage and the waste producers for keeping the waste safe until then.

For how long is the interim storage of highly radioactive waste possible?

Basically the producers of atomic waste are responsible for its safe interim storage. Legally, the permits for interim storage are limited to 40 years. I myself have advocated this limit as interim storage must not because of very long operational timeframes be perceived to be a de facto final repository.

Physically, though, it is true that highly radioactive waste must decay for several decades before it can be placed in a final repository. How long this is depends on the final repository design and the host rock. A minimum time period for this decay can be assumed to be around 35 years. This means that interim storage is a must.

In view of the timetables existing today for final storage, we can assume that safe interim storage will have to be guaranteed for longer than first planned. This extension of interim storage must however be kept as short as possible.